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IMPORT DEMAND  FOR RICE IN THE EEC:
IMPLICATIONS  OF U.  S. MARKET PROMOTION*
Yashwant N. Junghare, Randall Stelly  and Robert R. Wilson
The  European  Economic  Community (hereafter  THE ECONOMIC  FRAMEWORK
referred  to  as  EEC)  market  for  rice  has  been
undergoing  significant  reorganization  since  the  It seems  obvious that the import demand forrice It seems  obvious that the import demand for rice
formation  of the  economic  union  in  1957,  and  the  in  the EEC does  not operate  in an economic vacuum.
initiation  of the common  agricultural  policy in  1962  The  quantity  of rice  domestically  demanded  in  the
in general  and the  common rice  policy  in particular,  EEC  affects  not  only  their  own  production  and
which  became  effective  September,  1964.  The  rice  export  supply  but  also  the  imports  of  rice  from
trade policies  of the EEC have continually influenced  various  sources,  and  vice  versa.  Furthermore,  one
the  domestic  consumption  demand,  production,  import  supply  source  competes with another  import
exports  and imports of rice. Although the proportion  supply source in supplying rice to the EEC.
of  the  EEC  imports  of  rice  from  the  United  States  r  i  c  b  -^~~ ^.  . ~~~~The  theoretical issues  can be cast in a framework
increased  from  28  percent  in  the  pre-common  rice of classical  commodity  trade  theory. The  importing
policy  period to 41  percent in the  post-common rice ,.  . ,  ,  ^  ^i  ..  . country  (EEC)  experienced  demands  for the various policy  period,  the  effects  of  these  policies  on rice  rices  in  excess  of  the  supply  capabilities  of  its
imports into  the EEC continue  to concern  exporters domestic  producers  at the existing world  prices.  The
of rice. exporting  blocs  experienced  excess  supplies  from
Under  the  Agricultural  Trade  Development  and  their  domestic  production.  The  EEC  imported  rices
Assistance  Act of 1954 (commonly referred  to as P.L.  from  the  exporting  countries  in  order  to  satisfy  its
480), the American  Rice Council, in cooperation with  excess  demands.  In  order  to  protect  domestic  rice
the  U.S.  Foreign  Agricultural  Service  and  trade  producers,  the  importer  (EEC)  adopted  a  system  of
organizations  has been trying to maintain and expand  tariffs  (variable  levies)  applicable  to  rices  imported.
sales  of  U.S.  rice  in  foreign  countries  for  the  past  Thelevies  areintended  tohaveaneffectofadjusting
decade.  Primary emphasis  has been  given to the EEC  the price of rice from exporters upward in such a way
because  about  25 percent  (or  about  168,000  metric '  that  at the world  price,  exporters  can sell  less  rice in
tons) of the commercial  exports  of U.S.  rice in  1968  the  EEC  and  domestic  producers  receive  higher
was destined for the EEC market  and it was the single  prices.  This effect  can  be represented by shifts to the
most  important  hard  currency  market  for U.S.  rice.  left  in  the  demand  relationships  for  the  imported
The  purpose  of this paper is to point out the role  rices  and, of course,  a shift to the right  in the demand
of the U.S. market promotion in the EEC in affecting  for rice for domestic producers.
demand  for U.S.  and  other  rices and in offsetting the  In  order  to expand  its  own market  in the EEC
impact  of the  EEC  variable  levies  on the imports  of  and to offset  a portion  of the effect  of the levies  on
rice,  by  source,  in  the  EEC,  and  to  draw  some  the  demand  for its rice,  an enterprising  exporter, the
implications therefrom.  U.S.A.,  established  a  promotional  program  in  the
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137EEC.  The  promotional  program  was designed to shift  THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
to  the  right  the  demand  for all  rice  and  U.S.  rice  in
the  EEC.  This export policy also directly affected the  It  is not possible  to present the structural model
demand  relationships  for  rices  from other  exporting  employed  in  this  study,  but  some  description  of its
blocs.'  nature  is  essential to the discussion.2 The  model is of
the type  suggested by Harberger  [3]  for international
Given  the considerations just mentioned, further  trade  studies.  In  this  formulation,  import  demand trade  studies.  In  this  formulation,  import  demand
detail  must  be provided  on the operation  of the two  q  a  d  trade  po .. s ao  i  n te EC  quantities  are  determined  jointly  in  the  structural trade  policies  and  their  possible  affects  in  the  EEC  relationships.  That  is,  quantity  demanded  of  rice
rice  market.  As  mentioned  above,  the  EEC  has  from  a  particular  exporter  is  specified  to  be
adopted  a  variable  levy  system  to  regulate  its  rice  dependent  on its price, income  and other factors but
market.  It  fixes  a  threshold  price  (minimum  entryd  with quantities  demanded  from is jointly determined  with quantities  demanded  from
price)  of rice higher than the prevailing  world price to  o  e  r  .
protect  the domestic  producers from the competition  redced de  reationships may allow the modelle reduced demand relationships may allow the modeller
given  by the imports.  It also fixes a standardized  c.i.f.  to incorporate  a  considerable  amount of information
price  on  a  weekly  basis,  which  is  closer  to  the  on  substitution  among  import  demands  that  would
prevailing  world  price.  The  variable  levy,  Dt,  is  the  not be obtainable  from the use of prices alone.
difference  between  the  threshold price and the  c.i.f.The  structural  model  incorporated  import
price.  As  long  as  there  are open  trade practices,  the  demands  for  rice  from  the  U.S.  Asia  the  Middle
variable  levies  should  have  a  depressing  effect  on  Eas,  America,  and  fron  the  associate  EEC East,  Latin  America,  and  frcm  the  associate  EEC
imports.  members,  Madagascar  and  Surinam.  Also  included
The  U.S. market promotion may tend to increase  were  relationships  for  domestic  EEC  disappearance
sales  of  rice  from  some  exporting  blocs  and hinder  and  exports  of  rice  from  the  EEC.  An  identity
sales  from  others.  A  priori,  promotion  should  specifying  equilibrium  in  the  EEC  rice  market
positively effect  the import demand  for U.S.  rice.  The  completed  the  system.  The  system,  therefore,
U.S.  promotes  its  long-grain  rice  in  the  EEC.  The  contained  9  endogenous  variables,  13  exogenous
market  promotion  should have  some  positive effects  variables  and  9  structural  equations.  All  stochastic
on  sales  of  medium,  short-grain  and  broken  rice  equations  were  overidentified.  Because  of  the
because  of  increased  awareness  about  rice.  On  the  simultaneity  among  the endogenous  variables and the
other hand,  because  of  a stronger substitutability the  overidentification,  the  structural  parameters  were
market  promotion  could  hinder  sales  of  long-grain  estimated  using the two-stage  least squares procedure.
rice  imported  from other  sources.  Although detailed  The  data  used  in  the  estimation  were  the
data on  types  of rice  imported into  the EEC  are not'  calendar  year averages collected  from various sources,
available,  the evidence  available  from  GATT  [2]  and  predominantly  from  publications  of  the  United
FAO  [8]  suggests  that  the  rice  imports  from  the  Nations  and  Organization  for Economic  Cooperation
United  States  and Middle  East are predominantly  of  and  Development  [6,7,8,9,10].  All  quantities  were
long-grain  and  medium-grain  rice,  respectively;  on the basis  of per 1,000 population of the EEC, and
imports  from  Asia  and  Latin  America  are  all prices and the variable levy were in U.S. dollars per
predominantly  of broken  rice; and the imports  from  metric ton. The sample time period was  1953 through
Madagascar  and  Surinam  are  of  long-grain  and  1968.
medium-grain,  respectively.  However,  Asia,  In  this  paper  we  present  only  the elasticities  of
particularly  Thailand,  supplies  a  substantially  large  import  demands  for  rice  from  the  U.S.,  Asia,  the
tonnage  of long-grain  rice  to the EEC.  Surinam  also  Middle  East,  and  Latin  America,  and  the  associate
supplies  broken  rice  in  large  quantities  to  the EEC.  EEC  members,  Madagascar and Surinam, with respect
U.S.  promotional  efforts  should  effect  demands  for  to  the  U.S.  market promotion  and  the EEC variable
rice  from  these  exporting  blocs  according  to  the  levies.
degree  of substitutability for U.S. rice.  Since  the  statistical  properties  are  not generally
1The theoretical considerations  are explained  in detail in the Junghare Ph.D.  Dissertation  [5, pp. 52-59] .
2The  a  priori  model,  the variables,  and  the results  of econometric  estimation  are presented  in  detail in  the Junghare
Dissertation  [5, pp. 59-104].
3  This is simply  an allowance  in part for imperfections  in the EEC markets for the different rices.
138known  for  parameters  estimated  by  the  two-stage  the  various  sources is shown in Table 2, with the data
least  squares  method  for  finite  samples,  traditional  for  1968  as  a  base.  The total import  demands would
tests of significance  for  the estimated  parameters  are  increase  by  1,030  metric  tons,  of which 453 metric
not  appropriate  [1,  p.  75; 2, p.  16] .Therefore,  no  tons,  or  44  percent,  would  be  from  the  U.S.;  323
statements  of  confidence  in  these  estimates  can  be  metric  tons, or 31  percent, would be from the Middle
made. However, if a computed elasticity was based on  East;  and  23  percent  and  11  percent,  respectively,
a coefficient which was smaller  than its standard error  would  be  from  Latin  America  and  Surinam,  other
a  guarded interpretation  is given. The elasticities were  things being constant.6
computed  at  the  data  averages  for  the  1965-68  A  one  percent  increase  in  market  promotion
period.  The  EEC  market  policy  for  rice  was  fully  represents  an expenditure  of approximately  $2,900 is
implemented  during  this  period  and such  elasticities  associated  with  an  increase  in  rice  demand  at  the
may  be  reflective  of recent  trends  in  the  EEC  rice  1968  U.S. price  of $76,684, a  gross gain of about 26
market.  to  1. This  U.S. gain  in value of demand amounted to
48  percent  of the  total increase.  In  addition  to the
U.S.  gain,  Middle  East,  Latin  America  and  Surinam
Elasticities  of Import Demands with Respect  to U.S.  benefited  by  a  total  of  $103,058,  while  Asia  and
Market Promotion  Madagascar lost a total of $20,602.7
It is thus evident that the increase in the quantity
As shown in  Table  1, the model indicates that an  of  U.S.  rice  demanded  resulting  from an  increase  in
increase  of  1 percent  in  the  U.S.  expenditures  on  the  U.S.  market  promotion  appears  to  carry  along
market  promotion  in  the  EEC  increases  the  import  with  it  the  rice  import  demands  for  Middle  East,
demand  for  U.S.,  Middle  Eastern,  Latin  American,  Latin  America,  and  Surinam,  although  not  to  the
and  Surinam rice by 0.27 percent,  1.23 percent,  1.03  same extent.
percent,  and  0.40  percent,  respectively;  whereas the
same  percent  increase  in the  U.S. market  promotion
decreas  te  i  t  d  d  Asn  ad  Elasticities  of  Import Demands  with  Respect  to the decreases  the  import  demand  for  Asian  and
Madagascar  rice  by  0.06  percent  and  0.57  percent,  EEC Variable Levies
respectively.5 Since  the  elasticities  of Asian rice  and
Surinam  rice  are based on the coefficients  which were
smaller  than  their  individual  standard  errors,  they  As  shown in Table  , a  percent  increase  in the
may be of questionable value.  EEC  variable  levies  would  decrease  the  import
demand  for  U.S.  rice  by  0.32  percent;  the  import
These responses  in the EEC  import demands for  demands  for  Asia,  Middle  East,  and  Madagascar
rice  indicate  that the  U.S.  market  promotion in  the  would  decrease  by 0.17  percent,  0.74  percent,  and
EEC  may  be  increasing  total  imports  from  other  0.38  percent,  respectively;  whereas  the  import
sources  more  than  from the U.S.  itself.  This  appears  demands  for  Latin  America  and  Surinam  would
to be  so both in relative  terms and in  absolute terms.  increase  by  0.56  percent  and  0.15  percent,
The  effect,  as  given  by  the  model,  of  a  1 percent  respectively.  This  increase  is,  of course,  theoretically
increase  in  the  dollar  expenditures  of  U.S.  market  inconsistent. The imports of rice from Surinam are on
promotion  on  the import quantities  demanded  from  a preferential basis because of its associate membership
4As there are  13 exogenous variables and only  16 observations in  the system,  some readers may become  confused about
degrees  of  freedom,  efficiency  in  estimation,  and  the ability  to  solve  for  the  structural  parameter  estimates.  The  degrees  of
freedom  is  the  rank  of a  matrix  of a  quadratic  form  and  is  an  important parameter  if the quadratic  form  happens  to be the
chi-square  distributed  random  variable.  Since  the chi-square  distribution cannot be legitimately  applied to the quadratic forms in
question,  any  concern  about  degrees  of  freedom  is  irrelevant.  As  there  are  asymptotically  more  efficient  estimates  for  the
structural  parameters than two-stage least squares, higher levels of efficiency  might be obtained.  As a larger number of data points
always  contains  at least as  much information  as  a smaller number,  it is possible that increases  in  efficiency  in estimation  could
occur  if  more  than  16  observations  were  on hand.  However,  since  the exact  statistical  distributions  of these  estimates  are  not
known  inferences  about  efficiency  cannot be made.  Unique parameter estimates  can be  obtained  because the equations  are  all
overidentified  and  the moment matrices are of full rank. Multicollinearity did not appear to cause difficulty in estimation.
5U.S.  expenditures  for rice market promotion  in the EEC  amounted to  a yearly  average  of $189,000 during  1965-68
and  $420,000 during 1969-71.
6It should be remembered that these  are responses  in demand, not in equilibrium quantities.
7It  is  possible  that  changing  consumption  patterns  also  result  from  other  less  easily  measured  factors  than market
promotion.
139I  Table  1.  ELASTICITIES  OF  IMPORT  DEMANDS  FOR  RICE  WITH  RESPECT  TO  U.  S.
MARKET PROMOTION  AND THE EEC VARIABLE  LEVIESa
Elasticities with Respect to
Elasticities of  U. S. Market Promotion  EEC Variable  Levies
Import Demand for:
U.  S. Rice  +0.27  -0.32
Asian Rice  -0. 06b  -0.17 b
Middle  East Rice  +1.23  -0.74
Latin American Rice  +1.03  +0.56
Madagascar  Rice  -0.57  -0.38
Surinam Rice  +0.40b  +0.15
aThese  are the partial elasticities  computed at the averages for the 1965-68  period.
bBased on a coefficient  smaller than its standard error.
Table  2.  THE  EFFECT  OF  A  1 PERCENT  INCREASE  IN  U.  S.  MARKET  PROMOTIONAL
EXPENDITURES  ON THE EEC RICE IMPORTS
Quantity  Value
Import Demand for:  Metric Tons  Percent  Dollars  Percent
U. S. Rice  453  44.0  76,684  48.2
Asian Rice  - 25  - 2.4  -3,103  - 1.9
Middle East Rice  323  31.4  45,889  28.8
Latin American Rice  236  22.9  34,480  21.6
Madagascar Rice  -76  -7.4  - 17,499  - 11.0
Surinam Rice  119  11.5  22,689  14.3
NET TOTAL  1,030  100.0  159,140  100.00
in the  EEC.  In the case  of Latin  America, tacit trade  the  extent  to  which  U.S.  market  promotion  might
agreements,  bilateral  agreements  and/or  need  to be  increased  in order  to offset  the negative
government-to-government  contracts  are  suspected.  effect  of  a  5  percent  increase,  for  example,  in  the
The  slope  coefficients  on  which the elasticities of the  EEC variable  levies; and  (2)  the impact that might be
Asian  rice  and  Surinam  rice  are  based  were  smaller  expected  from  such  an  increase  on import  demands
than their individual standard errors.  for  rice  from  other  sources,  other  things  being
constant?
ROLE OF U.S.  MARKET PROMOTION IN  Now,  suppose  that  the  EEC  has  increased  the
MODIFYING  THE IMPACT  OF VARIABLE  LEVIES  variable  levies  by 5 percent.  The  elasticity of import
ON  RICE IMPORTS  demand  for U.S.  rice with respect to the EEC variable
levies is -0.32 (Table  1).  Therefore  the hypothetical 5
Generally  speaking,  the  increase  in  the  import  percent  increase  in  the variable  levies  would decrease
quantity  of  U.S.  rice  demanded  resulting  from  the  the  import  demand  for  U.S.  rice  by  1.60  percent.
market  promotion  appears  to  carry  along  with  it  This  decrease  amounts  to  2,683  metric  tons  if the
some  increases  in  rice  import  demands  from  other  import  demand for U.S. rice were at the 1968  level of
sources.  The  impact  of the EEC variable  levies on the  168,000  metric  tons.  In order  for  the United  States
import  demands  works  largely  in  the  opposite  to  maintain  their  sales  at  the  1968  level,  the  U.S.
direction.  Questions immediately  arise concerning  (1)  market promotion  would have to be increased.  Given
140the  elasticity of 0.27  for the import demand for U.S.  the  EEC  variable  levies  would  decrease  the  import
rice  with  respect  to  the  U.S.  market  promotion  demand  for  Middle  East  rice by  0=74  3.70 percent;
(Table  1),  the  U.S.  market  promotion  in  the  EEC  whereas  the  increase  of  5.93  percent  in  the  U.S.
would  need to be increased by - 5.93  percent.  market  promotion would increase  the import  demand
This  increase  amounts  to  $17,200  if  the  U.S.  for  Middle  East rice  by 5.93  X  1.23 =  7.23  percent,
expenditures  for market promotion in  the EEC were  thus  yielding  a  net  increase  of  7.23  - 3.70  =  3.53
at  the  1968  level  of  $290,000.  Thus,  the  United  percent.  When  translated  into  the  quantity data  for
States  has  not  gained  a net increase  in  their  sales to  1968,  this  net  increase  amounts  to 929  metric tons.
the  EEC by increasing the market promotion by 5.93  Similar  calculations  were  done  for  the  remaining
percent,  but  offset  the  2,683 metric  ton decrease  in  import  sources  in  the  EEC  and  the  results  are
the  quantity  demanded  in  the  EEC  that  would  presented  in  Table  3.  When  the  EEC  variable  levies
otherwise  have  occurred  due  to  the  hypothetical  are  increased  by  the  hypothetical 5 percent and the
increase in the variable levies,  offsetting  5.93  percent  increase  in  the  U.S.  market
promotion expenditures  is  achieved,  the total import
The  hypothetical  5 percent  increase  in  the EEC  demands in the EEC increase by 2,712 metric tons. In
variable levies and the offsetting 5.93 percent increase  the  absence  of  U.S.  market  promotion,  the  total
in the  U.S. market promotion needed to maintain the  quantity  imported  in the  EEC would have  decreased
sales  of  U.S.  rice  in  the  EEC  lead  to  marketwide  by  3,386  metric  tons;  whereas,  in  the  absence  of
changes  in  all the  sectors  of the EEC rice  economy.  variable  levies,  it  would  have  increased  by  6,098
For  example,  the  hypothetical  5 percent  increase  in  metric tons.
Table 3.  IMPACT  OF  A  5  PERCENT  INCREASE  IN  VARIABLE  LEVIES  AND  AN
OFFSETTING  5.93  PERCENT  INCREASE  IN  U.  S.  MARKET  PROMOTION  ON
IMPORT DEMANDS FOR  RICE IN THE EEC - 1968 BASE
U. S.  Market PooinU.S.  Market  Variable  Levies  Net Change
Promotional Activities
Import Demand of  %  change in  Quantity  change  %  change  in  Quantity change  %  change  in  Quantity  change
imports  in imports  imports  in imports  imports  in imports
U.S.  1.60  2,683  -1.60  -2,683  0.0  0
Asia  -0.35  -144  -0.85  - 351  -1.20  -495
Middle East  7.23  1,903  3.70  - 974  3.53  929
Latin America  6.11  1,402  2.80  643  8.91  2,045
Madagascar  -3.38  -453  -1.90  -255  -5.28  - 708
Surinam  2.37  707  0.75  234  3.12  941
NET CHANGE  6,098  -3,386  2,712
IMPLICATIONS  A  question  arises  concerning  which  country
should  foot  the  bill  for  such  market  promotional
activities?  According  to  the  model,  U.S.  market
U.S.  market  promotion  in  the  EEC  tends  to  promotion  for  rice  in  the  EEC  yields a  gross return
offset  in a  rather gross manner the negative impact of  ratio  vs.  cost in  terms of demand generated  of about
the  EEC  variable  levies  and  helps  to  maintain  the  26 to  1. Total gross  return to the U.S.  and all other
import demands  for rice.  This may be true for other  countries  and/or  regions  combined  was
agricultural  products  the  U.S.  is  promoting  in  the  approximately  54 to  1 from U.S. market  promotion
EEC.  The  EEC  is successful,  of course, in controlling  in  1968, with 48 percent of the gross returns going to
prices  of  rice  internally  through  the  variable  levy  the U.S.  This is so because the U.S. had 56 percent of
system  and thus in partially reducing  the competition  the import  rice market of the EEC in  1968. Thus, the
offered  by generally  lower-priced imported  rice. This  country  with the  largest  share  of this import  market
policy  aspect  of a  common market  over which third  is  apparently  gaining  the  most  from  market
countries  do not have any overt control can, however,  promotion.  In the case  of rice, the  U.S. is paying  all
be  overcome  through  concerted market promotion  as  the  costs  of  market  promotion  in  the  EEC.  The
long  as  net  returns  from  such  activities  are  greater  Middle East, Latin America and  Surinam benefited  by
than or equal to the costs incurred,  as  much  as  $103,058  from  the  U.S.  market
141promotion  in  1968.  Therefore,  a question arises as to  the  U.S.  or  some other country is  a party to market
whether  or not these  countries  should promote  their  promotion.  However,  one generalization  that emerges
own  rice,  or  if  they  should  share  in  the  U.S.  from  this study  is that  U.S.  market promotion  tends
promotion  costs.  If a Pareto criterion were applied to  to hinder  sales  of the  same  type  of rice  as the  U.S.
international  transactions,  it would be  apparent that  rice  that is  imported from other sources and promote
U.S.  promotion  could  adjust  the  market  toward  a  sales  of rice  which  is  not a  strong substitute  for  the
sub-optimal  position  under  the  assumption  that  U.S.  rice.  This patten seems reasonable  and may well
higher  rice  export  demand  is  preferable  to  the  occur for other commodities, but not necessarily.
individual countries.
U.S.  market  promotion,  though not designed  to  It  is apparent from the model that Latin America
affect  other  countries,  resulted in  large net beneficial  and  Surinam  benefited  for  the  U.S.  market
effects  to  other  countries,  particularly  those  of the  promotion  as  well  as  the  EEC  variable  levies.  This
Middle  East,  Latin  America,  and  Surinam;  whereas,  may  very  well  be  true  for  countries  which  are
there  were adverse effects on import demands for rice  associate  members  of a common market  or are having
from Asia  and  Madagascar.  The pattern of promoting  some  tacit  agreement,  bilateral  agreement  and/or
sales  of  agricultural  products  from  some  countries  government-to-government  contract  between
and  hindering  sales  from  others is  expected whether  importing and exporting parties.
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